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Recent pronouncements of the courts and policymakers of the European Community and the
United States underscore converging trends and standards in antitrust enforcement. Economic
regulators on both sides of the Atlantic seek more vigorous enforcement abroad in order to make
their antitrust laws meaningful and effective at home. Yet this movement toward extraterritorial
enforcement often leads to conflict among trading partners and uncertainty for transnational com-
merce. Renewed efforts are needed to develop a uniform approach to antitrust law that reflects the
interests and respects the policies of both the EC and the United States. Otherwise, regulators may
find themselves undercutting the competitiveness of the very economies they seek to promote.
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INTRODUCTION
After a period of relative calm, the debate over the circum-
stances in which one nation may assert jurisdiction over activity
by persons outside its territory that has anticompetitive conse-
quences inside its territory - extraterritoriality - has been rein-
* A version of this Article will be published in 1993 FoRaHAaI CoRP. L. INST. (Barry
E. Hawk ed., 1994). Copyright © Transnational Publications, Inc., 1994.
** Partner, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Washington, D.C. Mr. Griffin is also the
Partner-in-Charge of the Brussels office of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, a former Chair of
the ABA's Section of International Law and Practice, and a member of the ABA's Spe-
cial Committee on International Antitrust. He was counsel for the British Government
in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California. The views expressed in this article are entirely
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vigorated. New top antitrust enforcers have been named in the
European Community ("EC") and the United States, and the
U.S. Supreme Court has issued its first pronouncement on the
issue in 30 years. This paper will analyze recent developments in
extraterritoriality jurisprudence and offer advice on how to cope
with this increasingly complex area.
I. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EC
A. Articles 85(1) and 86
Articles 85(1)' and 862 of the Treaty Establishing the Euro-
pean Economic Community prohibit certain conduct that has an
anticompetitive effect "within the Common Market" and may af-
fect trade between Member States. Unlike the U.S. antitrust
laws, these provisions do not contain language asserting jurisdic-
tion over commerce "with foreign nations."3
The requirement in articles 85(1) and 86 that the chal-
lenged conduct "may affect trade between Member States" has
been satisfied where the effect is direct or indirect, actual or po-
tential.4 Such an effect, however, must be "appreciable," which
appears to mean more than "de minimis" or "perceptible," but
1. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art.
85(1), 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-i1), 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47-48 [hereinafter
Treaty]. Article 85(1) provides in relevant part that:
The following shall be deemed to be incompatible with the Common Market
and shall hereby be prohibited: any agreements between enterprises, any deci-
sions by associations of enterprises and any concerted practices which are
likely to affect trade between the Member States and which have as their ob-
ject or result the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the
Common Market....
Id. (emphasis added).
2. Treaty, supra note 1, art. 86, 298 U.N.T.S. at 48-49. Article 86 provides in rele-
vant part that:
Any abuse by one or more enterprises of a dominant position within the Com-
mon Market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible
with the Common Market in so far as it may affect trade between Member
States.
Id. (emphasis added).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act prohibit practices in interstate commerce and in trade or commerce "with
foreign nations." Id. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which deals with
unfair methods of competition, employs the phrase "in commerce." 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
4. Soci6t6 Technique Mini~re v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, Case 56/65, [1966]
E.C.R. 235, 249, [1966] 5 C.M.L.R. 357, 375; Co6peratieve Stremsel-en Kleurselfabriek v.
Commission, Case 61/80, [1981] E.C.R. 851, 867, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 240, 257.
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less than "substantial."5
The European Court of Justice's most recent pronounce-
ment on extraterritoriality is its 1988 Re Wood Pulp Cartel: A. Ahl-
str6m Osakeyhtid v. EC Commission6 ("Wood Pulp") decision. In that
case, non-EC producers of wood pulp were sued by the Commis-
sion of the European Communities (the "Commission") for vari-
ous restrictive practices that were alleged to have restrained
trade within the Common Market.' A number of the producers
had no subsidiaries or branches in the Common Market and
one, Pulp, Paper and Paperboard Export Association of the
United States, formerly Kraft Export Association ("KEA"), was a
U.S. Webb-Pomerene export association. 8 These defendants ar-
gued that there was no jurisdiction over them because they were
located outside the Common Market.9 They also argued that
the application of the EC's competition rules to them would be a
breach of the public international law'duty of non-interfer-
ence. 10 KEA maintained that a Webb-Pomerene association re-
flected the U.S. Government's policy of promoting exports and
exempting exporters from the U.S. antitrust laws." The Court
of Justice disagreed. The Court held that under Community law,
jurisdiction exists over the firms outside the Community, if they
"implement" a price-fixing agreement reached outside the Com-
munity by selling to purchasers within the Community.'" The
Court also rejected the defendant's "non-interference" argu-
ment, because the Webb-Pomerene Act merely exempts export
cartels from U.S. antitrust laws; it does not require anticompeti-
tive activity within the Common Market." Moreover, U.S. anti-
5. V61k v. Vervaecke, Case 5/69, [1969] E.C.R. 295, 302, [1969] 8 C.M.L.R. 273, 282;
EC Commission, Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance, O.J. C 231/2 (1986); see
2 BARRY E. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRusT: A
COMPARATIVE GUIDE Ch. 7, at D2 (2d ed. 1992).
6. Re Wood Pulp Cartel: A. Ahlstr6m Oy v. EC Commission, Joined Cases 89, 104,
114, 116, 117 & 125-129/85, [1988] E.C.R. 5193, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 901 [hereinafter
Wood Pulp].
7. Id., (1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 938.
8. Id. at 5241, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 940. A Webb-Pomerene association is an associ-
ation formed for the sole purpose of export trade and may benefit from antitrust ex-
emptions. 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1988).
9. Id., [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 939.
10. Id., [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 940.
11. Id., [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 940.
12. Id. at 5243, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 941.
13. Id. at 5244, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 941-42.
1994]
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trust authorities had been informed of the proceedings at an
early stage, and did not object to them.'4 According to the
Court, the "decisive factor" was the place where the challenged
conduct was implemented, not the place where its effect was felt:
The producers in this case implemented their pricing
agreement within the common market. It is immaterial in
that respect whether or not they had recourse to subsidiaries,
agents, sub-agents, or branches within the Community in or-
der to make their contacts with purchasers within the Com-
munity.
Accordingly the Community's jurisdiction to apply its
competition rules to such conduct is covered by the territori-
ality principle as universally recognized in public interna-
tional law. 5
EC officials have not hesitated to attack conduct outside the
EC that restricts imports into the Common Market if there is a
potential, appreciable effect on trade between Member States 6
Since Wood Pulp, the Commission has used the "implemented
within the EC" concept to assert jurisdiction over a Norwegian
producer of PVC that allegedly participated in a price fixing car-
tel. 17 In another decision challenging an agreement to fix prices
and set quotas by suppliers of low-density polyethylene, the Com-
mission again utilized the Court's "implementation" approach to
assert jurisdiction over cartel members located outside the Com-
mon Market. One member of the cartel, however, was a Spanish
company, whose activities took place in Spain before Spain had
become a member of the EC. The Commission asserted jurisdic-
tion over that company "[t]o the extent that its involvement in
the cartel affected competition within the Community."'"
On the other hand, restraints related to EC exports to non-
EC countries are unlikely to be challenged unless it is probable
that the goods or services involved will be re-exported to the EC
and subsequently will be involved in trade between Member
14. Id,
15. Id. at 5243; [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 941.
16. See, e.g., Aluminum Imports from E. Europe, OJ. L 92/1, 47-48 (1985), [1976
Transfer Binder.] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,658; EMI Records v. CBS United
Kingdom Ltd., Case 51/75, [1976] E.C.R. 811, 848, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 235, 266-67.
17. Re the PVC Cartel: The Community v. Atochem SA, OJ. L 74/1, 14 (1989),
[1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 345, 370.
18. Re the LdPE Cartel: The Community v. Atochem SA, OJ. L 74/21, 35 (1989),
[1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 382, 409-10.
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States.' 9
B. International Comity
The EC adheres to the 1986 OECD Recommendation that
Member States exercise moderation and restraint in the extrater-
ritorial application of their competition laws, by recognizing "the
need.., to give effect to the principles of international law and
comity and to use moderation and self-restraint in the interest of
cooperation in the field of restrictive business practices."20 How-
ever, when the EC asserted jurisdiction over a cartel of EC and
non-EC aluminum producers who allegedly agreed to- regulate
imports into the EC, the Commission held that comity did not
militate in favor of declining the exercise ofjurisdiction because
the application of Community law:
does not require any of the undertakings concerned to act in
any way contrary to the requirements of their domestic laws,
nor would the application of Community law adversely affect
important interests of a non-member State. Such an interest
would have to be so important as to prevail over the funda-
mental interest of the Community that competition within
the common market is not distorted.... ..
The Court of Justice has said little about international com-
ity. In the IBM v. Commission22 case ("IBM"); the then-Assistant
Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division of the U.S.
Department of Justice, reportedly requested that the Commis-
sion not impose certain remedial measures on IBM because they
would "constitute a 'quasi-confiscatorial' action that would be
highly unfavorable to the U.S. trade position."23 In its appeal of
the Commission's decision, IBM argued that the Commission
19. Bulk Oil v. Sun Int'l Ltd., Case 174/84, [1986] E.C.R. 559, 589, [1986] 2
C.M.L.R. 732, 762; Distillers Co., O.J. L 50/16 (1978); Uan. 1976-Feb. 1978 Transfer
Binder - New Developments] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,011.
20. Revised Recommendation of the OECD Council Concerning Cooperation Be-
tween Member Countries on Restrictive Business Practices Affecting International
Trade, OECD Doc. No. C (86) 44 (Final) (May 21, 1986) [hereinafter OECD Recom-
mendation], reprinted inJoseph P. Griffin, U.S. International Antitrust Enforcement: A
Practical Guide to the Justice Department Guidelines, 53 C.P.S. (BNA), at B-801 (1989),
at Worksheet 8, and 25 I.L.M. 1629 (1986).
21. Aluminum Imports from E. Europe, O.J. L 92/1, 48 (1985), Uan. 1982-June
1985 Transfer Binder - New Developments] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,658.
22. IBM v. Commission, Case 60/81, [1981] E.C.R. 2639, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. 635.
23. William M. Carley, Critics See Impropriety in European Lobbying by Antitrust Chief,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 1982, at Al.
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erred when it failed to consider international comity before it
initiated proceedings or rendered a decision. 24 The Court re-
jected that argument and indicated that it was unnecessary to
consider international comity before a decision was rendered
and that the Commission had not rendered a decision within the
meaning of Article 173.25
It appears that the Commission believes that international
comity is a matter of prosecutorial discretion, including consul-
tation within the College of Commissioners,26 and not a legal
prerequisite to the exercise ofjurisdiction. The Court's decision
in Wood Pulp devotes the following single sentence to interna-
tional comity:
As regards the argument relating to disregard of interna-
tional comity, it suffices to observe that it amounts to calling
into question the Community's jurisdiction to apply its com-
petition rules to conduct such as that found to exist in this
case and that, as such, that argument already has been re-
jected. 7
The above quoted cryptic sentence in Wood Pulp may indicate
that the Court agrees that international comity is an issue within
the Commission's discretion, at least in facts similar to Wood
Pulp, i.e., the challenged conduct was not required by foreign
law28 and the remedy does not require the entities to act in any
24. IBM, [19811 E.C.R. at 2650 14, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. at 658.
25. Id. at 2655, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. at 662.
26. THE RT. HON. SIR LEON BRITrAN, COMPETrrION PoLIcv AND MERGER CONTROL
IN THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET 16-17 (1991).
[T]he Commission as a collegiate body does not have to consult another de-
partment or branch of government to ascertain the likely impact of a pro-
posed course of action on the Community's external relations. A Commission
decision on competition policy reflects the totality of the Commission's views
and policies. My colleague in charge of external relations sits near me in
Commission when decisions are taken and his department talks to mine.
Id.
27. Wood Pulp, Joined Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 & 125-129/85, [1988] E.C.R.
5193, 5244, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 901, 942.
28. Franco-Japanese Ballbearings Agreement, Comm. No. 29, 1974, O.J. L 343/19,
23 (1974), [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. D8, D14-D15. In the Franco-Japanese Ballbearings decision,
the Commission similarly held that measures resulting from agreements or concerted
practices between Japanese firms that were merely authorized by the Japanese authori-
ties under Japanese law (as opposed to measures that were imposed on Japanese firms
by the Japanese authorities or measures taken in pursuance of trade agreements be-
tween the Community and Japan) could be subject to Article 85 because the firms
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way contrary to the requirements of their local laws.29 Addition-
ally, in 1991, Sir Leon Brittan, then the Commissioner in charge
of Competitive Policy, stated that the EC Commission "does con-
sider itself obliged to have regard to comity when exercising its
jurisdiction in competition cases with a foreign element."30
C. Regulation of Mergers and Joint Ventures
On December 21, 1989, the EC Council of Ministers unani-
mously adopted the Commission's proposal for a Regulation on
"Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings" ("Merger
Regulation"). ' With the passage of the Merger Regulation, af-
ter sixteen years of debate, the Member States granted the Com-
mission broad new powers designed to make the Commission, in
most cases, the sole authority within the EC to review and ap-
prove large mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures, including
those involving foreign companies.3 2 The Merger Regulation es-
tablishes a clear distinction between transactions of "Community
dimension," for which the Commission has responsibility, and
smaller combinations, over which Member State authorities may
apply national legislation.33
The Merger Regulation took effect on September 21, 1990,
and applies to all industries except those governed by merger
would be free to enter into the agreements or engage in the concerted practices. Id.
COMMISSION THIRD REPORT ON COMPETITION PoLIcY 20 (1974).
29. Council Regulation No. 4056/86, O.J. L 378/4, 8-9 (1986), 2 Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 2821K. Article 9 of Regulation No. 4056/86 on Maritime Transport
provides that if the application of the Regulation to restrictive practices conflicts with
"provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action" of third countries, the
Commission "shall, at the earliest opportunity," enter into consultations and negotia-
tions aimed at reconciling the conflicting interests. Id.; see Helmut W.R. Kreis, EC Com-
petition Law and Maritime Transport, 37 ANTrrRUST BULL. 481 (1992).
30. BRrrrAN, supra note 26, at 16.
31. Council Regulation No. 4064/89, OJ. L 395/1 (1989), amended by O.J. L 257/
15 (1990). See Barry E. Hawk, The EEC Merger Regulation: The First Step Toward One-Stop
Merger Control, 59 ANTrrRusT L.J. 195 (1990); Symposium, EEC Merger Regulation Proce-
dure: A Practical View, 1990 FoRDHAM CORP. L. INST. 353 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1991);
Frank L. Fine, The Substantive Test of the EEC Merger Control Regulation: The First Two Years,
61 ANTITRUST L.J. 699 (1993); H. Colin Overbury, Politics or Policy? The Demystification of
EC Merger Control, in 1992 FoP.DHAM CORP. L. INST. 557 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1993);
DAMIEN NEVEN ET AL., MERGER IN DAYLIGHT: THE ECONOMICS AND POu-TICS OF EUROPEAN
MERGER CONTROL (1993).
32. Council Regulation No. 4064/89, O.J. L 395/1 (1989), amended by O.J. L 257/
13 (1990).
33. Id., art. 21, OJ. L 395/1, at 11 (1989).
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provisions of the Coal and Steel Treaty.34 Under the Regulation,
the Commission has the sole power to review business combina-
tions - including complete or partial mergers, takeovers, cer-
tain joint ventures and the purchase of minority controlling in-
terests - when the financial thresholds of a "Community dimen-
sion" are met.35 The financial thresholds are calculated
according to the value of products sold and services provided in
the EC;36 physical presence in the EC is not required. Thus, the
Regulation also reaches transactions involving companies with
no facilities within the Common Market, as long as their world-
wide and EC sales meet the required financial thresholds.
Any transaction with a Community dimension must be re-
ported promptly to the Commission. 7 After notifying the Com-
mission, the transaction is effectively suspended for three weeks
following notification, even where it has no adverse competition
implications.38 The suspension can be continued by the Com-
mission thereafter to ensure the effectiveness of a potential deci-
sion prohibiting the concentration. If an adverse decision is
made, the Commission can include an order for divestiture in an
appropriate case. 9
The Merger Regulation is silent on the issue of whether the
Commission has extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction. For
example, would the Commission attempt to require a non-EC
entity to divest itself of a company it had acquired outside the EC
because of perceived anticompetitive effects within the EC?
Some Commission officials appear to have little doubt that it
would. Relying on Wood Pulp they have contended that:
If two extra-Community undertakings merge, one might
argue that inevitably their concentration will be 'imple-
mented' in the EC with respect to consumers located therein.
One might equally argue that it has direct, substantial and
34. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Art. 65 and 66
(Apr. 18, 1951), 261 U.N.T.S. 140, 194-204 [hereinafter ECSC Treaty]. For concentra-
tions in the EC steel industry which fell both under the EC Regulation and the ECSC,
see Usinor Sacilor/ASD, O.J. C 193/34 (1991), and Pchiney/Usinor-Sacilor, O.J. C
175/18 (1991).
35. Council Regulation No. 4064/89, art. 3, O.J. L 395/1, at 4 (1989), amended &y
OJ. L 257/13 (1990).
36. Id. art. 1, 0.J. L 395/1, at 3 (1989).
37. Id. art. 4, 0.J. L 395/1, at 4 (1989).
38. Id. art. 7, O.J. L 395/1, at 6 (1989).
39. Id. art. 7, 0.J. L 395/1, at 6 (1989).
EC AND U.S. EXTRATERRITORJALITY
reasonably foreseeable effects in the Community. For the
purpose of merger control, therefore, the difference between
'implemented' and 'effect' is largely a question of semantics
and is unimportant.
The Regulation therefore gives the Commission jurisdic-
tion to prohibit concentrations in situations in which they are
concluded in third countries but create or strengthen a domi-
nant position within the Community. In Tetra Pak/Alfa-Laval
(M37) for example, the Commission opened proceedings but
subsequently approved the takeover by a Swiss company of a
Swedish undertaking. There is no doubt that if a dominant
position was found in the Community the Commission would
have prohibited the concentration.40
In proceedings under the Merger Regulation, the Commis-
sion may attempt to take international comity into account by
limiting remedies to EC territory. 41
D. Recent Enforcement Policy
In one of his first speeches as the Commissioner in charge
of competition policy, Karel Van Miert told a London audience
in May 1993 that:
Companies and especially multinational ones increasingly op-
erate at world level and there needs to be an adequate Com-
munity response. Its thrust is twofold. It needs to ensure
both:
(i) that anticompetitive practices outside the EC do not
destroy companies and competitiveness inside the
EC or exploit Community consumers, and
(ii) that anti-competitive practices in third markets do
not prevent EC companies having access to these
markets (for example, closed distribution systems)
and thwart trade liberalisation.
The Commission has a range of instruments ranging from the
unilateral application of its own rules, through bilateral and
regional arrangements, to multilateral arrangements. The
Commission will not hesitate to use its powers where neces-
sary to preserve undistorted competition inside the EC and
market access outside where genuine cases are brought to its
attention. It goes without saying that a close coordination be-
40. CHRISTOPHERJONES & ENRIQUE GONZALEZ-DIAZ, THE EEC MERGER REGULATION
90 (1992).
41. Id.; JoHN COOK & CHIus KERSE, EEC MERGER CONTROL 9 (1991).
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tween trade and competition policies is necessary to ensure
success.
4 2
Mr. Van Miert's statement indicates that the Commission
will continue, as it has since the 1960's, to espouse a broad no-
tion of jurisdiction based on effects4" despite the fact that the
Court of Justice declined in Wood Pulp and earlier decisions to
endorse the "effects" approach to jurisdiction. 4
II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE U.S.
A. Sections 1 & 2 of the Sherman Act
In the 1945 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America45 ("Al-
coa") decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
acting for the Supreme Court,46 announced an "effects" test of
42. Karel Van Miert, Analysis and Guidelines on Competitive Policy, Address
Before the Royal Institute of Int'l Affairs, London 5 (May 11, 1993) (on file with au-
thor).
43. See, e.g., COMMISSION ELEVENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 35 (1981).
The Commission, citing its 1964 Grosfillex, [1964] 3 C.M.L.R. 237, decision, stated in its
Eleventh Report on Competition Policy that "[t]he Commission was one of the first
antitrust authorities to have applied the internal effect theory to foreign companies."
Id. The Commission was even more explicit in Aniline Dyes Cartel, OJ. L 195/11 (1969),
[1969] 8 C.M.L.R. D23, stating that "[t]his decision is applicable to all the undertakings
which took part in the concerted practices, whether they are established within or
outside the Common Market .... The competition rules of the Treaty are, conse-
quently, applicable to all restrictions of competition which produce within the Com-
mon Market effects set out in Article 85(1)." In re Aniline Dyes Cartel, O.J. L 195/11
(1969), [1969] 8 C.M.L.R. D23, D33; see COMMISSION FOURTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETI-
TION POLICY 60 (1984) (Commission's decisions in Eastern Aluminum and Wood Pulp
.reflect[ ] the policy, which is essential in view of the realities of modern world trade,
that all undertakings doing business within the EEC must respect the rules of competi-
tion in the same way, regardless of their place of establishment ('effects doctrine')");
Eastern Aluminum, O.J. L 92/1 (1984), [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 813, Wood Pulp, OJ. L 85/1
(1984), [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 474; see also ICI v. Commission [hereinafter Dyestuffs], Case
48/69, [1972] E.C.R. 619, 629, [1972] 11 C.M.L.R. 557 (Commission argues thatjurisdic-
tion of the Community is justified by reason of economic effects that claimant's conduct
produced in the Common Market).
44. See, e.g., Dyestuffs, [1972] E.C.R. at 693-96, [1972] 11 C.M.L.R. at 603-08 (declin-
ing to adopt formulation of effects doctrine suggested by Advocate General Mayras).
Mr. Mayras posited three conditions for applying the effects doctrine: (1) an agree-
ment or practice must create a direct and immediate restriction of competition in the
Community; (2) the effect must be reasonably foreseeable; and (3) the effect must be
substantial. Id. at 693-96, [1972] 11 C.M.L.R. at 603-08.
45. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
46. SeeJAMEs R. ATWoOD & KINGMAN BREWSTER, 1 ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BusI-
NESS ABROAD § 6.05, at 147 (2d. ed. 1981) (stating that Supreme Court could not
achieve quorum because too many Justices were disqualified).
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jurisdiction under the U.S. antitrust laws.4 7 According to Judge
Learned Hand, the United States has jurisdiction over wholly
foreign conduct, as well as other conduct, if that conduct has an
effect within the United States that was intended.4" In its 1962
decision in Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.,4 9
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld U.S. jurisdiction over a U.S.
company's Canadian subsidiary, which had restrained the export
sales of another American company. The Court held that "[a]
conspiracy to monopolize or restrain the domestic or foreign
commerce of the United States is not outside the reach of the
Sherman Act just because part of the conduct complained of oc-
curs in foreign countries." °
In its 1976 Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America5" deci-
sion, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
the "effects" test of jurisdiction enunciated in Alcoa is "by itself
incomplete because it fails to consider other nations' interests.
Nor does it expressly take into account the full nature of the
relationship between the actors and this country."52 The Ninth
Circuit adopted a 'jurisdictional rule of reason"53 that involves
evaluating and balancing numerous relevant factors. 54  The
Third, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits accepted the Timberlane mode
of analysis, 5 while the D.C. and Seventh Circuits questioned its
47. Akoa, 148 F.2d at 444.
48. Id. at 443-44.
49. 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
50. Id. at 704.
51. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976)
[hereinafter Timberlane I], on remand, 574 F. Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1983), affd, 749
F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter Timberlane II], cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985).
52. Timberlane , 549 F.2d at 611-12.
53. See ANrrrRusT ANn AMEMCAN BUSINESS ABROAD, supra note 46, at 446. King-
man Brewster is generally credited with coining the phrase "jurisdictional rule of rea-
son." Id.
54. Timberlane , 549 F.2d at 614. The Timberlane I factors are:
[T] he degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance
of the parties and the locations or principal places of business of corporations,
the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve
compliance, the relative significance of effects on the United States as com-
pared with those elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to
harm or affect American commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the
relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the United
States as compared with conduct abroad.
Id.
55. See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d
Cir. 1979); Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 884-85 (5th Cir.
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validity.56 In 1987, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
of the United States ("Restatement (Third)") adopted a Timberlane-
like approach.
The 1982 Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act
("FTAIA") amended the Sherman5" and the Federal Trade Com-
mission-9 Acts to provide that challenged conduct in export
commerce or wholly foreign conduct must have a "direct, sub-
stantial, and reasonably foreseeable" effect' on United States
domestic commerce or on the trade of a person engaged in ex-
port commerce. Congress took. a neutral stance toward the
1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983); Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax, Inc., 661 F.2d
864, 869-70 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1001 (1982).
56. See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 948-49
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding Timberlane factors "are not useful in resolving the contro-
versy"); In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1255 (7th Cir. 1980) (failing
to apply Timberlane test did not constitute abuse of discretion).
57. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 403 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (TmRD)]. The Restatement notes that "all rele-
vant factors" may be considered but specifically lists eight factors relevant to ajurisdic-
tional analysis:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the ex-
tent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial,
direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, be-
tween the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activ-
ity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation is
designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation
to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities,
and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally ac-
cepted;
(d) the existence ofjustified expectations that might be protected or hurt by
the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state might have an interest in regulating the
activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), at § 415.
58. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1988).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(3) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
60. H.R. REP. No. 686,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1982). The legislative history of the
FTAIA indicates that Congress intended "reasonably foreseeable" to be an objective
practical standard: "The test is whether the effects would have been evident to a reason-
able person making practical business judgments, not whether actual knowledge or in-
tent can be shown." Id.
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Ninth Circuit's "jurisdictional rule of reason" mode of analysis in
the legislative history of the FTAIA.6 1 Until its June 1993 deci-
sion in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,62 the U.S.
Supreme Court had not taken any position on the Timberlane
mode of analysis.
B. International Comity
In 1988, the Attorneys General from several states and many
private plaintiffs brought antitrust suits against American and
English insurance companies, contending that they violated the
Sherman Act by agreeing to alter certain terms of insurance cov-
erage and agreeing not to offer certain other types of insurance
coverage.63 Included among the defendants were a number of
London-based reinsurers, who, according to plaintiffs, agreed to:
(1) restrict the terms on which reinsurance would be written and
refuse to reinsure certain risks; (2) write all North American cas-
ualty reinsurance agreements with a pollution exclusion; and (3)
boycott retrocessional reinsurance agreements that included cer-
tain North American property risks, unless the original insur-
ance contained certain exclusions.64 The British defendants
moved to dismiss the complaint as to them, on the ground that
the Sherman Act should not apply to conduct entirely outside
the United States, by non-Americans, that was lawful where it oc-
curred.6 5
Relying on the FTAIA, the district court held that the Brit-
ish defendants' challenged foreign conduct was subject to juris-
diction under the FTAIA because plaintiffs adequately alleged
that:
[A] decision not to provide reinsurance or retrocessional rein-
surance to cover certain types of risks in the United States has
a direct effect on the availability of primary insurance in the
United States.66
Applying the three-part test laid down by the Ninth Circuit
61. Id.
62. -.U.S.-, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993).
63. In re Insurance Antitrust Litigation, 723 F. Supp. 464, 468, 470-71 (N.D. Cal.
1989), rev'd, 938 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1991), affid in reevant part and rev'd in part, Hartford
Fire Insurance Co. v. California, -.U.S.-, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993).
64. 723 F. Supp. at 484-85.
65. Id. at 484.
66. Id. at 486.
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in Timberlane II,67 the district court concluded that, upon consid-
eration of the international comity factor of the test, extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction should not be asserted. 68 On plaintiffs' appeal, a
Ninth Circuit panel affirmed the district court's holding that the
alleged effects in the United States were sufficient under the
FTAIA, but reversed the district court's ruling that international
comity required a dismissal.69
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
"the court of appeals properly assess[ed] the extraterritorial
reach of the U.S. antitrust laws in light of this Court's teachings
and contemporary understanding of international law when it
held that a U.S. district court may apply U.S. law to the conduct
of a foreign insurance market regulated abroad?"7" The British,
Canadian, and U.S. Governments filed amicus curiae briefs.
Justice David H. Souter's analysis for the 5-4 majority, which
included the retiring Justice Byron R. White, begins by noting
that the British defendants conceded that there was jurisdiction
under the Sherman Act as a result of their London-based, chal-
lenged conduct.71 The defendants, however, contended that the
district court should have declined to exercise jurisdiction under
the principles of international comity.72 Justice Souter also
noted that because the issue of jurisdiction arose in the context
of a motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs' allegations that the British
defendants participated in conduct that was intended to and did
produce a substantial effect in the U.S. insurance market must
be assumed to be true.7" According to Justice Souter, "it is well
established by now that the Sherman Act applies to foreign con-
duct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some
67. Timberlane II, 574 F. Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1983), afl'd, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985). Under the tripartite Timberlane II inquiry,
a court examines:
(1) the effect or intended effect on the foreign commerce of the United
States; (2) the type and magnitude of the alleged illegal behavior; and (3) the
appropriateness of exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction in light of considera-
tions of international comity and fairness.
Id. at 1382 (citing Timberlane I, 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976)).
68. In re Insurance Antitrust Litigation, 723 F. Supp. at 490.
69. In re Insurance Antitrust Litigation, 938 F.2d at 932-34.
70. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2900 n.9
(1993).
71. Id. at .,113 S. Ct. at 2909 n.24.
72. Id. at , 113 S. Ct. at 2909.
73. Id. at , 113 S. Ct. at 2909 n.21.
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substantial effect in the United States." 74 Moreover, when Con-
gress enacted the F'AIA, it declined to express a view on the
question whether a court with jurisdiction under the Sherman
Act should abstain from exercising such jurisdiction on the
grounds of international comity.71 Justice Souter declared that
the Court need not decide that question, because, even assum-
ing an affirmative answer, "international comity would not coun-
sel against exercising jurisdiction in the circumstances alleged
here."76
The majority rejected the argument of the British defend-
ants and the British Government, that a conflict between U.S.
and British law arose because the challenged conduct was consis-
tent with British law and policy, because there was no "true con-
flict" between U.S. and British law." Relying on Section 415 of
the Restatement (Third), the majority held that a "true conflict"
does not exist where a person subject to regulation by two na-
tions can comply with the laws of both.7 8 In this case, the
London reinsurers did not argue that British law required them
to act in a fashion prohibited by U.S. law, nor did they argue that
their compliance with the laws of both countries was otherwise
impossible. 79 Thus, according to the majority, there was no
"true conflict" and, therefore, no need to consider whether the
U.S. court should decline, on the basis of international comity,
to exercise its jurisdiction."
Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the four dissenters, ar-
gued that, under factors set forth in Section 403 of the Restate-
ment (Third), any nation having a basis for jurisdiction to pre-
scribe a law, must refrain from exercising thatjurisdiction if such
an exercise ofjurisdiction would be unreasonable.8 1 The dissent
stated that
74. Id. at -, 113 S. Ct. at 2909.
75. Id. at -' 113 S. Ct. at 2910 (citing H.R. REP. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d. Sess.,
at 13 (1982)).
76. Id. at __ 113 S. Ct. at 2910.
77. Id. at -' 113 S. Ct. at 2910-11.
78. Id. at -, 113 S. Ct. at 2911.
79. Id.
80. Id.; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respon-
dents at 27-29, Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 2891
(1993).
81. Hartford Fire Insurance, - U.S. at __, 113 S. Ct. at 2921-22 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing); see REsTATEMENT (THIR), supra note 57, § 403 (discussing Timberlane-like ap-
proach).
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[r] arely would these factors point more clearly against applica-
tion of United States law. The activity relevant to the counts
at issue here took place primarily in the United Kingdom,
and the defendants in these counts are British corporations
and British subjects having their principal place of business
or residence outside the United States. . . . I think it
unimaginable that an assertion of legislative jurisdiction by
the United States would be considered reasonable, and there-
fore it is inappropriate to assume, in the absence of statutory
indication to the contrary, that Congress has made such an
assertion. s2
Justice Scalia argued that the majority "completely mis-inter-
preted" the Restatement (Third)"3 and characterized the majority's
holding that "no true conflict... exists unless compliance with
United States law would constitute a violation of another coun-
try's law," as a "breathtakingly broad proposition, which contra-
dicts the many cases discussed earlier."84 Justice Scalia and his
dissenting colleagues predicted that the majority's holding "will
bring the Sherman Act and other laws into sharp and unneces-
sary conflict with the legitimate interests of other foreign coun-
tries - particularly our closest trading partners."8 5
C. Mergers and Joint Ventures
Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits the direct or indirect
acquisition by one person of all or any part of the stock or assets
of another person "where in any line of commerce or in any
activity affecting commerce in any section of the [United States],
the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen com-
petition or tend to create a monopoly."8 6 Both the acquiring
and acquired entities must be persons that are engaged in com-
merce or in any activity affecting commerce.8 7 Moreover, the po-
tential anticompetitive effects of the acquisition must be "in any
section of the [United States]. " "8 Thus, transactions by firms
outside the United States are covered if they affect U.S. com-
merce. If, however, the only anticompetitive effects of the trans-
82. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., - U.S. at -., 113 S. Ct. at 2921 (citations omitted).
83. Id. at -, 113 S. Ct. at 2922.
84. Id. at ., 113 S. Ct. at 2921-22 (emphasis in original).
85. Id. at..., 113 S. Ct. at 2922.
86. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
87. Id.
88. Id.
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action are outside of the United States, Section 7 does not ap-
ply. 89
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act requires that parties to certain
large mergers and corporate joint ventures notify the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission of their proposed transaction, and wait for stated
periods of time before consummating the transaction. 90 The fi-
nancial thresholds for notification apply to transactions by for-
eign companies outside the United States.9' However, the im-
plementing regulations exempt the following types of transac-
tions in certain situations: (1) acquisitions by U.S. companies of
foreign assets or of voting securities of foreign entities whose
U.S. assets and sales do not meet the minimum threshold re-
quirements; (2) acquisitions, by foreign companies of foreign
assets or of voting securities of foreign companies not resulting
in direct or indirect control over U.S. assets or corporations
meeting the minimum threshold requirements or, if both parties
to the acquisition are foreign, when the combined U.S. sales and
combined U.S. assets are each less than U.S.$110 million; (3)
acquisitions by foreign states, governments, or agencies (other
than corporations engaged in commerce); and (4) acquisitions
by or from companies "controlled" by foreign governments, of
assets located in, or corporations organized under the laws of,
that foreign state.92
The 1988 U.S. Justice Department's "Antitrust Enforcement
Guidelines for International Operations" ("International Guidelines")9s
contain several illustrative cases relating to merger analysis. In
particular, case four of the International Guidelines, analyzes the
merger of two foreign firms and restates the position taken in
89. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
91. See id. (stating filing of premerger notification and waiting period applies to
acquiring person).
92. Id.; see 16 C.F.R §§ 801-03 (1993). See generally STEPHEN M. AxiNN ET AL., Ac-
QUISITIONS UNDER THE HART-SCOTT-RODINO ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS Acr (2d ed.
1988).
93. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelinesfor International Operations,
in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,109, 55 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1391,
at S-3 [hereinafter International Guidelines]. See generally Joseph P. Griffin, United States
International Antitrust Enforcement: A Practical Guide to the Justice Department Guidelines, in
53 C.P.S. (BNA), at B-801 (1989) (discussing insights and information relevant to Inter-
national Guidelines); Wilbur L. Fugate, The New Justice Department Antitrust Enforcement
Guidelines for International Operations, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 295 (1989).
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United States v. CIBA Corp. ,94 that the Justice Department will not
challenge an anticompetitive merger abroad unless one or both
of the entities has U.S. production facilities or substantial distri-
bution assets in the United States.95
Because U.S. enforcement authorities have recognized that
mergers between U.S. and non-U.S. companies involve situations
of concurrent jurisdiction, they have attempted to fashion struc-
tural relief in a manner that permits the merger to go forward
abroad while satisfying U.S. antitrust concerns.9 6 There appear
to be no reported cases in which challenges under the U.S. anti-
trust laws have been successfully mounted against mergers be-
tween foreign firms transacting no business in the United States.
U.S. enforcement authorities, however, have sued foreign firms
for failing to report transactions under the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act9" and recently for the first time sued a foreign company for
failing to notify its acquisition of other foreign companies with
94. United States v. CIBA Corp., 1970 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 73,269 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(consent decree) (permitting merger of two foreign firms on condition that certain
U.S. assets be divested to eliminate anticompetitive effects in United States).
95. See International Guidelines, supra note 93, at 113,109.83, 55 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1391, at S-28-29.
96. See, e.g., Hanson plc, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 23,107 (FTC Mar. 9, 1992)
(consent agreement) (challenging tender offer by an English company for the shares of
another English firm settled by divestment of some of their California assets); Institut
Merieux S.A., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 22,779 (FTC Aug. 6, 1990) (consent agree-
ment) (acquisition of Canadian firm by French competitor permitted after Canadian
firm agreed to lease business in Toronto for at least 25 years to an FTC-approved ac-
quiror); United States v. American Brands, Inc., 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 65,276
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (consent decree) (acquisition by U.S. stapler company of British stapler
company with U.S. subsidiary permitted but U.S. company ordered to divest one of its
two lines); United States v. Merck & Co. Inc., 1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,682 (S.D.
Cal. 1980) (consent decree) (acquisition permitted on condition that U.S. acquired
company divest a Canadian subsidiary); United States v. Gillette Co., 1976-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 60,691 (D. Mass. 1975) (consent decree) (acquisition permitted on condition
that new company be created with German company to sell in United States).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Beazer plc, 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,923 (D.D.C.
1992) (consent decree) (imposing U.S.$760,000 civil penalty for failure to notify);
United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 1990-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,976 (D.D.C. 1990)
(consent decree) (imposing U.S.$275,000 civil penalty for failure to file important doc-
ument with premerger notification form); United States v. Tengelmann, WHG, 6 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 45,089 (Case 3624) (D.D.C. June 5, 1989), 1989-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 1 68,623 (D.D.C. 1989) (consent decree) (imposing U.S.$3 million civil penalty
for failure to notify); United States v. Lonrho, PLC, 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 45,088
(Case 3535) (D.D.C.July 13, 1988), 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,232 (D.D.C. 1988)
(consent decree) (imposing U.S.$122,000 civil penalty for failure to notify); United
States v. Bell Resources, Ltd., 1986-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 67,321 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (con-
sent decree) (imposing U.S.$450,000 penalty for failure to notify).
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significant sales in the United States. 98
D. Recent Enforcement Policy
In the International Guidelines the U.S. Department ofJustice
took the position that it may assert jurisdiction under the effects
doctrine when the U.S. Government pays for or finances more
than half the cost of a foreign transaction.99 According to the
Department:
There is no reason to believe that in enacting the FTAIA Con-
gress intended to immunize anticompetitive conduct with re-
spect to sales to the U.S. Government. To do so would have
been to place the burden of anticompetitive pricing squarely
on the shoulders of U.S. taxpayers, something that the De-
partment will not assume that Congress intended. Rather,
the Department will assume that Congress intended to pre-
serve for U.S. taxpayers the main benefits of competition
among U.S. firms.' 0
0
In late 1989, the Department of Justice announced a
U.S.$32.7 million payment to the United States by ninety nine
Japanese construction companies as the result of settlement of
bid-rigging charges related to construction for the U.S. Navy in
Japan. 1 1 The Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Anti-
trust Division said that "this settlement represents a major step
towards the United States' goal of insuring free competition on
U.S.-funded contracts regardless of where they are located."
1°2
Subsequently, the Department of Justice obtained a pre-
judgment attachment from a Japanese court freezing U.S.$1.6
million of the assets of another alleged member of the
bid-rigging cartel.'0 3
98. U.S. v. Anova Holding AG, 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 70,383 (D.D.C. Sept. 7,
1993) (consent decree) (imposing U.S.$414,650 civil penalty for failure to notify).
99. See International Guidelines, supra note 93, 1 13,109 at 20,611, 55 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1391, at S-3.
100. International Guidelines, supra note 93, 13,109 at 20,611, 55 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1391, at S-3; see, e.g., United States v. Standard Tallow
Corp., 1988-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,913 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (consent decree prohibiting
suppliers of tallow from fixing prices for sales financed by U.S. government).
101. Japanese Bid Rigging Case Settlement, 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,028
(Dec. 19, 1989).
102. Id.
103. Japanese Court Freezes Assets of Firm that Didn't Settle U.S. Bid Rigging Claim, 58
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1468, at 853 (May 31, 1990). Another alleged
member of the cartel settled for U.S.$34,000. See Japanese Construction Company Settles
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In similar cases, ten Japanese electronics companies agreed
in March 1992 to pay U.S.$2.7 million to settle bid-rigging
charges involving telecommunications contracts at U.S. military
installations in Japan; 104 and in July 1993, twenty-seven Japanese
construction firms paid more than U.S.$1 million to settle civil
claims that they rigged bids on contracts at the U.S. Naval Base
at Sasebo. 105
In April 1992, the U.S. Justice Department rescinded a state-
ment in a footnote to its International Guidelines0 6 and an-
nounced that the Justice Department will take antitrust enforce-
ment action against conduct occurring overseas that restrains
U.S. exports, whether or not there is direct harm to U.S. con-
sumers, where it is clear that:
(1) the conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably fore-
seeable effect on exports of goods or services from the United
States;
(2) the conduct involves anticompetitive activities which vio-
late the U.S. antitrust laws-in most cases, group boycotts,
collusive pricing, and other exclusionary activities; and
(3) U.S. courts have jurisdiction over foreign persons or cor-
porations engaged in such conduct.1
0 7
This 1992 policy removed a self-imposed restriction on the Jus-
tice Department's exercise of jurisdiction under the U.S. anti-
trust laws' 08 that was inconsistent with prior cases. 109
The recently appointed Assistant Attorney General in
U.S. Accusations of Bid Rigging Cartel, 59 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1475, at
95 (July 19, 1990).'
104. Japanese Communications Contractors Settle U.S. Price Fixing Accusations, 62 Anti-
trust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1554, at 269 (Feb. 27, 1992).
105. Japanese Companies Settle US. Navy Bid Rigging Claims, 65 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1629, at 311 (Aug. 26, 1993).
106. See International Guidelines, supra note 93, 13,109 at 20,611 n.159, 55 Anti-
trust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1391, at S-21 n.159.
107. Justice Department's April 3 Statement of Enforcement Policy: Department of Justice
Policy Regarding Anticompetitive Conduct that Restricts U.S. Exports, 62 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1560, at 483 (Apr. 9, 1992); see also Justice Department Will Challenge
Foreign Restraints on U.S. Exports Under Antitrust Laws, 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 50,084
(Apr. 3, 1992).
108. SeeJoseph P. Griffin, New U.S. Enforcement Policy is Assessed, NAT'L LJ., Mar. 16,
1992, at 23.
109. See, e.g., United States v. C. Itoh & Co., 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 65,010
(W.D. Wash. 1982); Daishowa Int'l v. North Coast Export Co., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
64,774 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
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charge of the Antitrust Division has reaffirmed this policy,110 and
has given enforcement actions against foreign companies a high
priority."' According to the Chief of the Antitrust Division's
Foreign Commerce Section, under the Clinton Administration,
the challenge for U.S. antitrust enforcement policy is:
First to promote and safeguard open and competitive
global markets for the benefit of the world's consumers and
producers.
And second, to make sure that our enforcement strate-
gies and our enforcement tools are up to the job of dealing
with the global marketplace.
12
In October 1993 the Chairman of the Federal Trade Com-
mission stated that:
[A]s active participants in the United States economy, for-
eign firms must comply with U.S. antitrust laws. It is only fair
that those who wish to sell in our markets play by the same
rules as domestic producers.
[W] e consider the interests of other nations when under-
taking investigations involving foreign actors, in order to
avoid conflicts."
3
III. THE EC/U. S. ANTITRUST COOPERATION AGREEMENT
In 1990 Sir Leon Brittan suggested that a treaty "or less for-
mal agreement" be negotiated to allocate jurisdiction between
the U.S. Government and the EC Commission in transnational
merger cases. 1 4 Sir Leon expressed considerable concern that
110. Anne K. Bingaman, Change and Continuity in Antitrust Enforcement, Ad-
dress Before the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, New York (Oct. 21, 1993), in 7
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,123 (1993); Charles S. Stark, International Antitrust -
U.S. Views, Address Before the American Bar Association, New York (Aug. 9, 1993), in 7
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 50,114 (1993).
111. Anne K. Bingaman, Address Before the A.B.A. Antitrust Section, New York
(Aug. 10, 1993), in 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1627, at 250 (Aug. 12,
1993); Rich Jaroslovsky, Washington Wire. A Special Weekly Report From the Wall Street Jour-
nal's Capital Bureau, WALL ST. J., July 2, 1993, at Al; Catherine Yang, Annie Gets Her
Antitrust Gun, Bus. Wv., Aug. 23, 1993, at 23.
112. Stark, supra note 110, 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,114 at 48,940.
113. Janet D. Steiger, Perspectives on U.S. International Enforcement, Address
Before the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, New York (Oct. 21, 1993), in 7 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,122 at 48,976 (1993).
114. Sir Leon Brittan, Competition Policy in the European Community- The New
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the EC Merger Regulation gave the EC significant new enforce-
ment authority concerning large transnational mergers and joint
ventures, including those of U.S. companies that have significant
sales in the EC. 115 Consequently, he believed that the chances of
clashes over jurisdictional prerogatives and remedies had in-
creased.'1 16
In September, 1991, the EC Commission and the U.S. Gov-
ernment (the "Parties") signed an agreement regarding the ap-
plication of their competition laws ("the Agreement"). l1 7 This
Agreement was designed to promote cooperation and avoid con-
flicts in their antitrust enforcement activities. 1 8 The Agreement
is an evolutionary step from the 1986 OECD Recommendations
relating to Restrictive Business Practices1 9 and the prior U.S.




Merger Regulation, Address Before the European Community Chamber of Commerce,
New York, 11 (Mar. 26, 1990) (on file with author).
115. Id.
116. Id.; COMMISSION TWENTiETH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICV 17 (1991).
117. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Commission of the European Communities Regarding the Application of their Compe-
tition Laws, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1491 (1991), 61 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 1534, at 382 (Sept. 26, 1991) [hereinafter Agreement]. The Agreement was effec-
tive upon signing on September 23, 1991. 30 I.L.M at 1502. SeeJohnJ. Parisi, The EC-
U.S. Agreement Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws: Another Step
Towards Fostering International Cooperation in Antitrust Enforcement, Address
Before the European Trade Law Ass'n, Brussels, (Dec. 12, 1991) (on file with author);
Allard D. Ham, International Cooperation in the Antitrust Field and in Particular the Agreement
Between the United States of America and the Commission of the European Communities, 30
COMMON MKr. L. REv. 571 (1993); Joseph P. Griffin, EC/US Antitrust Cooperation Agree-
ment: Impact on Transnational Business, 24 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1051 (1993).
118. Agreement, supra note 117, 30 I.L.M. at 1492.
119. See OECD Recommendation, supra note 20, 53 C.P.S. (BNA), at B-801, 25
I.L.M. at 1629.
120. Australia-United States: Agreement Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Mat-
ters, June 29, 1982, T.I.A.S. No. 10,365, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 702 (1982). See generally
Stephen D. Ramsey, Note, The'United States-Australian Antitrust Cooperation Agreement: A
Step in the Right Direction, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 127 (1983).
121. Canada-United States: Memorandum of Understanding as to Notification,
Consultation and Cooperation with Respect to the Application of National Antitrust
Laws, Mar. 9, 1984, reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 275 (1984), 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
50,464; see generally Gary E. Dyal, Comment, The Canada-United States Memorandum of
Understanding Regarding Application of National Antitrust Law: New Guidelines for Resolution
of Multinational Antitrust Enforcement Disputes, 6 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1065 (1985) (dis-
cussing extraterritorial antitrust enforcement).
122. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Federal Republic of Germany Relating to Mutual Cooperation Re-
[Vol. 17:353
1994] EC AND US. EXTRATERRITORIAIdTY 375
Enforcement officials on both sides of the Atlantic have
made it clear that since the Agreement was signed, the flow of
information between them has increased significantly. In the
first two years, U.S. enforcers sent about sixty notifications to
Brussels and received about forty from the EC Commission. 123
In the year prior to the Agreement, U.S. enforcers sent four noti-
fications and received two.' 2
4
Since the EC Merger Regulation came into force in Septem-
ber 1990, at least twelve transactions formally reviewed by the
Commission have involved situations in which both parties were
headquartered outside the EC. 1 5 About 10% of the pre-closing
notification filings required by Hart-Scott-Rodino involve at least
one company headquartered in the EC.126 More than 20% of
the transactions that have been notified under the EC Merger
Regulation also have been subject to Hart-Scott-Rodino filings
or, if not, nonetheless have been reviewed by U.S. antitrust au-
thorities.127 Four widely publicized examples of transactions re-
garding Restrictive Business Practices, June 23, 1976, U.S.-F.R.G., 27 U.S.T. 1956,
T.I.A.S. No. 8291.
123. John J. Parisi, The EC-U.S. Agreement Regarding the Application of Their
Competitive Laws: An Update on What Has Been Accomplished, Address Before the
European Trade Law Association, Brussels (June 10, 1993) (on file with author).
124. Charles S. Stark, Chief, Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust Division, The
U.S.-EC Antitrust Agreement and International Cooperation in Merger Control, Ad-
dress Before the First Annual European Community Merger Control Symposium, Brus-
sels (Oct. 13, 1992) (on file with author).
125. See Council Regulation No. 4064/89, O.J. L 395/1 (1989), amended by OJ. L
257/15 (1990); see also Ericsson/Hewlett-Packard, Case No. IV/M292 (Mar. 12, 1993),
cited in OJ. C 83/5 (1993); Del Monte/Royal Foods, Case No. IV/M277 (Dec. 9, 1992),
cited in O.J. C 331/13 (1992); Pepsico/General Mills, Case No. IV/M232 (Aug. 5, 1992),
cited in O.J. C 228/6 (1992); Ericsson/Ascon, Case No. IV/M236 (July 8, 1992), cited in
O.J. C201/26; Mondi/Frantschach, Case No. IV/M210 (May 12, 1992), cited in OJ. C
124/19; Ingersoll Rand/Dresser, Case No. IV/M121 (Dec. 18, 1991), cited in OJ. C 86/
15 (1992), [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 349; BankAmerica/Security Pacific, Case No. IV/M137
(Oct. 24, 1991), cited in OJ. C 289/14, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 898; Delta/Pan Am, Case No.
IV/M130 (Sept. 13, 1991), cited in O.J. C 289/14 (1991), [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. M56; Ky-
owa/Saitama Banks, Case No. IV/M069 (Mar. 7, 1991), cited in OJ. C 66/13 (1991),
[1992] 4 C.M.L.R. M105; AT&T/NCR, Case No. IV/MO50 (Jan. 18, 1991), cited in O.J. C
16/20 (1991), [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. M41; Matsushita/MCA, Case No. IV/M037 (Jan. 10,
1991), cited in OJ. C 12/15 (1991), [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. M36; Mitsubishi/Union Carbide,
Case No. IV/M024 (Jan. 4, 1991), cited in O.J. C 5/7 (1991), [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. M50.
126. U.S., EC Commission Sign Antitrust Cooperation Accord, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
No. 38, 1407 (Sept. 25, 1991).
127. Stark, supra note 124, at 17; U.S. -EC Notices Increase Since Accord; Confidential-
ity Concerns are Downplayed, 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1554, 267 (Feb.
27, 1992).
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viewed by EC and U.S. enforcers are: Gillette's bid to acquire
certain parts of Wilkinson Sword,"2 8 the merger of Ingersoll-
Rand's and Dresser's pump operations, 29 the DuPont/ICI asset
swap,'-" and the investigations of Microsoft's licensing prac-
tices.13 1
A. "Positive Comity"
The Agreement provides that if one of the Parties believes
that its "important interests" are being adversely affected by an-
ticompetitive activities occurring within the territory of the other
Party that violate that Party's competition laws, the affected Party
may request that the other Party initiate enforcement activi-
ties."' 2 The Agreement, however, provides that the Party receiv-
ing such a request is not under any obligation to initiate enforce-
ment proceedings and that the requesting Party is not precluded
from undertaking its own enforcement activities.13 3
Enforcers have referred to this provision as reflecting "posi-
tive comity" in order to distinguish it from the traditional notion
of "comity," which involves concepts of moderation and restraint
in enforcement.134 This "positive comity" provision was in-
tended to avoid the long-running dispute concerning the propri-
ety under international law of assertions of extraterritorial juris-
128. United States v. Gillette Co., 1990-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,142 (D.D.C.
1990) (consent decree); Warner-Lambert/Gillette O.J. L 116/21 (1992).
129. Dresser/Ingersoll Rand, Case No. IV/M121 (Dec. 18, 1991), cited in O.J. C
86/15 (1992), [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 349; Divestiture Resolves Division Concerns Over Proposed
Merger of Pump Operations, 63 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1584, 418 (Oct. 1,
1992).
130. DuPont de Nemours/ICI, Case No. IV/M214 (Sept. 30, 1992) cited in O.J. C
7/13 (1993); In Re Imperial Chemical Industries PLC, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
23,417 (1993); 58 Fed. Reg. 37,944 (1993) (proposing consent agreement).
131. FTC Closes Antitrust Probe of Microsoft; Antitrust Division Begins its Own Probe, 65
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1629, 288 (Aug. 26, 1993); Louise Kehoe, EC to
Probe Antitrust Allegations Against Microsoft, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1993, at 22.
132. Agreement, supra note 117, art. V(2), 30 I.L.M. at 1498, 61 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep (BNA) No. 1534, at 383-84.
133. Id. art. V(4), 30 I.L.M. at 1498, 61 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
1534, at 384.
134. COMMISSION, TWENTy-FIRST REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 64 (1992); see,
e.g. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). The Member States of the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD"), have agreed to avoid or
minimize conflicts with foreign laws, policies or interests by following an approach of
"moderation and self-restraint in-the interest of co-operation in the field of restrictive
business practices." See OECD Recommendation, supra note 20, at B-801, 25 I.L.M. at
1630.
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diction. It could be used, for example, by EC officials con-
fronted with a buyers' cartel of U.S. purchasers fixing the
purchase price of goods manufactured in the EC and exported
to the United States. It might also be used by both EC and U.S.
officials in an attempt to coordinate activities against anticompe-
titive activity conducted outside the EC and the United States.
However, "positive comity" applies only when the challenged
conduct violates the competition laws of the host country. Thus,
export activity permitted under host state law is not covered,
even if it adversely affects the important interests of the Party
requesting assistance. One expert commentator has opined that
the impact of "positive comity" will be marginal.
It is not realistic to expect one government to prosecute its
citizens solely for the benefit of another. It is no accident
that this has not happened in the ,past, and it is unlikely to
happen in the future. We should not expect the principle of
positive comity... to impact dramatically on the proposition
that laws are written and enforced to protect national inter-
ests.1
35
B. Avoidance of Conflicts
The Agreement also calls on each Party to take account of
the other Party's "important interests" at all stages of its enforce-
ment activities.13 The Agreement notes that "important inter-
ests" of a Party may exist in the absence of official involvement
by that Party with the activity in question. However, "it is recog-
nized that such interest would normally be reflected in antece-
dent laws, decisions or statements of policy by its competent au-
thorities."'3 7 The Agreement sets forth a list of six factors, 138 in
135. James I. Atwood, Positive Comity. - Is It a Positive Step?, in 1992 FoRDHAM
CoRp. L. INST. 79, 87 (Barry Hawk ed., 1993).
136. Agreement, supra note 117, art. VI, 30 I.L.M. at 1498-99, 61 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1534, at 384.
137. Id. art. VI(1), 30 I.L.M. at 1499, 61 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
1534, at 384.
138. Id. art. VI(3), 30 I.L.M. at 1499-1500, 61 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 1534, at 384. The factors are very similar to the factors utilized by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the Timberlane line of cases. Timberlane Lumber Co.
v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 613-14 (9th Cir. 1976), on remand, 574 F. Supp. 1453
(N.D. Cal. 1983), affid, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984) cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985).
The factors are also similar to the Antitrust Division in its International Guidelines. See
International Guidelines, supra note 93, 1 13,109 at 20,612-13 n.170, 55 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1391 at S-22-23 n.170, and those suggested by the American Law
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addition to any other factors that appear relevant in the specific
circumstances, to be considered in evaluating the proposed en-
forcement activities.139
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
A. "Implement" vs. 'Effect"
Shortly after the Wood Pulp decision, the former Assistant
Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, Charles F.
Rule, contended that the Wood Pulp decision was, as a practical
matter, "very close to, if not indistinguishable from, the so-called
'effects' test as applied by U.S. courts ... ."140 The then-Commis-
sioner in charge of EC competition policy, Sir Leon, rejected
that contention:
The learned Advocate General in the Wood Pulp case, Mr.
Darmon, developed at length the qualifications to be at-
tached to the notion of effects .... The Court did not con-
sider the qualifications and it is in my view unreasonable to
assume unqualified espousal of a doctrine in a judgment
which does not mention it by name, while those who urged its
adoption accepted that it should be qualified. So the Court
of Justice does not endorse the effects doctrine ....
•.. But the Court of Justice held the sale in the Commu-
nity at a concerted price was implementation, and I find that
conclusion thoroughly reasonable and appropriate, in the
light of competition law's purposes and territorial scope.
Nevertheless, this specific use of the word "implementation"
rather than "effects" suggests to me that implementing con-
duct perhaps has to be direct, substantial, and foreseeable for
jurisdiction to be engaged.' 4 1
Institute in Section 403 of its Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States. See RESTATEMENT (THIR), supra note 57, at § 403.
139. Agreement, supra note 117, art. VI(3), 30 I.L.M. at 1499-1500, 61 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1534, at 384.
140. Asst. Atty. General Charles F. Rule, The Justice Department's Antitrust En-
forcement Guidelines for International Operations - A Competition Policy for the
1990s, Address Before the International Trade Section and Antitrust Committee of the
District of Columbia Bar, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 29, 1988) (on file with author).
141. Sir Leon Brittan, Jurisdictional Issues in EEC Competition Law, Address at
Cambridge, England (Feb. 8, 1990) (on file with author); see also Walter Van Gerven,
ECJurisdiction in Antitrust Matters: The Wood Pulp Judgment, in 1989 FoRDHAm CoRP. L.
INsT. 451, 466-67 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1990) ("[I]t is clear that the Court has... con-
sciously refrained - in the Wood Pulp case as well as, earlier, in the Dyestuffs cases -
from endorsing the effects doctrine.")
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The practical importance to EC competition policy enforc-
ers of the distinction between anticompetitive conduct outside
the EC "implemented" in the Common Market and the "effect"
of such conduct in the Common Market is limited to a few, rare
situations. These select situations include concerted refusals to
buy from, or export to, the EC and agreements to restrict non-
EC production in order to create a scarcity outside the EC that
would raise prices within the EC. It has been argued that the
Court's notion of "implementation" within the EC, could in-
clude omissions within the EC such as refusals to supply. Such a
result, however, would be a clear extension of existing Court de-
cisions. 142 Moreover, as one commentator has noted
[t]he objective territoriality principle traditionally permits a
state to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign national where a
consummating act within the state's territory was a constitu-
ent element of an agreement made abroad. With omissions,
there is no "consummating act within the Community" that
can justify the assertion of jurisdiction on objective territorial
grounds. Thus, for the implementation approach to remain
faithful to the Community's professed desire to assertjurisdic-
tion solely on the basis of the territoriality principle, it ap-
pears necessary to exclude certain traditional antitrust viola-
tions from its jurisdictional purview.143
In the few situations in which there is no "implementation"
within the Common Market, the Commission probably would
utilize the "effects" theory to challenge the conduct. In appro-
priate circumstances it also could invoke the "positive comity"
provisions of the EC/U.S. Antitrust Agreement to seek the U.S.
Government's assistance. Assistant Attorney General Bingaman
has made it clear that she will utilize the Hartford Fire Insurance
decision to vigorously enforce the effects theory of jurisdic-
tion. 14 4
142. See, e.g.,Jose Perez Santos, The Territorial Scope of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, in
1989 FoRDHAm Colu. L. INsT. 571, 575-77 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1990); Theofanis Chris-
toforou & David B. Rockwell, European Economic Community Law: The Territorial Scope of
Application of EEC Antitrust Law, 30 HAsv. INT'L LJ. 195, 204 (1989).
143. Roger P. Alford, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws: The United
States and European Community Approaches, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 36 (1992).
144. See Bingaman, supra note 110, 1 50,123.
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B. "Appreciable" vs. "Substantial" Effect
Justice Souter noted in the majority opinion in Hartford Fire
Insurance that the FTAIA was intended to exempt from the Sher-
man Act export transactions that did not injure U.S. commerce,
and that it was "unclear" how the Act might apply to the conduct
alleged in that case, which had been characterized below as a
limitation on the import of insurance into the United States.'45
The majority held that they did not need to address that ques-
tion, because, even if the FTAIA did apply, its requirement of a
"direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect" on U.S.
commerce was "plainly me [t] ."146
There may be conduct that causes an "appreciable" effect
sufficient to trigger EC jurisdiction, but does not have a "sub-
stantial" effect under U.S. precedents. Similarly, some conduct
might cause a "reasonably foreseeable" effect under U.S. law, but
would not be deemed to be "intentional" under EC law. These
distinctions, however, do not appear to have hindered enforce-
ment initiatives on either side of the Atlantic.
C. International Comity
The U.S. Government's amicus brief in Hartford Fire Insur-
ance agreed with the British defendants' contention that the
principles of international comity may be invoked in antitrust
cases. 14 7 Moreover, although the U.S. Government stated that it
prefers the analysis of international comity set forth in the Inter-
national Guidelines, it stated that the Timberlane 'Jurisdictional
rule of reason test" provides "a useful framework for analyzing
comity issues." t 48
145. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, -.U.S.-., 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2909
n.23 (1993).
146. Id.
147. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at
22, Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, -.U.S.-., 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993) (No. 91-
1111) ("[w] e agree with petitioners that principles of comity may be invoked in antitrust
cases. .. ").
148. Id. at 25. The Department of Justice and Timberlane factors are substantially
the same, with two exceptions. The Department's International Guidelines omit
Timberlane's consideration of enforcement compliance; and Timberlane omits the Inter-
national Guidelines' consideration of the existence. of reasonable expectations that would
be furthered or defeated by the lawsuit. Compare International Guidelines, supra note 93
at 20,612-13, 55 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1391. at S-22 with Timberlane
Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 613-14 (9th Cir. 1976), on remand, 574 F.
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1. Actions Initiated by the U.S. Government
The U.S. Government's brief also took the position, not ad-
dressed by the Court, that "courts should not engage in any com-
ity analysis in antitrust actions brought by the United States." 149
This position is a reaffirmation of a similar statement in the Inter-
national Guidelines,5 0 which was explained by the former Assis-
tant Attorney General for Antitrust as follows:
[F] ederaljudges should [not] assume a role as mini-diplomats
every time they consider an antitrust case with an interna-
tional flavor. The judicial branch is independent of foreign
policy coordination; giving the judiciary unlimited discretion
under the guise of "international law" or other equally amor-
phous notions to consider and resolve trade frictions created
by antitrust suits would do more harm than good. Rather,
application of objective, discrete doctrines such as the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine and the doctrine of foreign sovereign
compulsion, combined with a faithful adherence to the "di-
rect, substantial and reasonably foreseeable" effects test,
should eliminate most concern .... Courts, however, should
never be allowed to dismiss a case on the ground of "foreign
relations."15 '
Other than a general reference to the separation of powers
doctrine, the International Guidelines cite no judicial precedent
for applying one jurisdictional standard to government prosecu-
tions and another to private suits. Nor, is there any indication
that higher courts would accept the argument that they are con-
strained from reviewing prosecutorial decisions on the basis of
comity or from taking account of foreign relations considera-
tions.'5 2 An Article III court must construe the application of
the antitrust laws to foreign commerce as Congress, not the ex-
Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1983), affd, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S.
1032 (1985).
149. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 27,
Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, -U.S.-, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993) (No. 91-
1111).
150. See International Guidelines, supra note 93, at 13,109.10 n.167, 55 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1391. at S-22 n.167.
151. Asst. Atty. General Charles F. Rule, The Justice Department's Antitrust En-
forcement Guidelines for International Operations Address Before the International
Trade Section and Antitrust Committee of the District of Columbia Bar, Washington
D.C. (Nov. 29, 1988) (on file with author).
152. In United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 3, 6 n.5 (D.D.C. 1990),
aff'd, 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990) defendants, citing a diplomatic note from the Finn-
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ecutive branch, deems appropriate. 15
The broad assertion of executive power fails to note that the
Congress is given responsibility under the U.S. Constitution for
regulating commerce with foreign nations.'5 4 The Sherman Act
was passed pursuant to that constitutional authority, and noth-
ing in that Act frees the executive branch from having to comply
with its provisions. On the contrary, the Sherman Act has been
held to reach conduct by U.S. government officials.' 55 More-
over, there is nothing in the legislative history of the Act to indi-
cate that the Congress intended different standards to apply to
government prosecutions and private suits.
The ABA report on the International Guidelines 56 criticized
ish Embassy, argued the court should decline to exercise jurisdiction because of princi-
ples of international comity. The trial court rejected the argument noting:
[W]hatever the relevance of comity concerns in antitrust disputes between pri-
vate parties, see Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 938 (D.C. Cir.
1984), they are not a factor here. The State Department has considered Fin-
land's position, and the United States has decided to go ahead with the case.
It is not the Court's role to second-guess the executive branch's judgment as to
the proper role of comity concerns under these circumstances.
731 F. Supp. at 6 n.5. The ABA's Special Committee on International Antitrust noted
that:
[11n Baker Hughes, however, U.S. competition was centrally implicated and the
only "comity" concern appeared to be that Finland, whose national was sued,
objected to the suit. If the only concern was possible interference with U.S.
relations with Finland, Judge Gesell's decision not to second guess the govern-
ment was unobjectionable.
ABA SPECIAL COMMrIrEE ON INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST, REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITIEE
158 n.38 (1991). The author of this article was a member of the ABA Special Commit-
tee.
153. See generally Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988) (stating that where Congress
intends to preclude judicial review of executive action, its intent must be clearly ex-
pressed). The principle of separation of powers assumes a role for each of the three
branches of government, not, as the Justice Department states, only for the executive
branch. Congress passes laws affecting foreign commerce. The executive administers
those laws, and conducts U.S. foreign policy consistently with those laws. The courts
construe that legislation and determine the legality of executive action consistent with
that legislation, with the U.S. Constitution, and with standards that the courts define for
themselves. International law is part of the law of the United States, except to the ex-
tent that Congress has decreed otherwise. Congress has not, in the antitrust law, abro-
gated international law. See, e.g., Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64,
118 (1804) (Marshall, CJ.) ("[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to vio-
late the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains...
154. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
155. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Consumers
Union of the United States, Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 1004 (1975).
156. Report to the House of Delegates ABA Section of Antitrust Law and Section
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the Department's position because:
There has been wide consensus for years that the courts play
an important role in the law of foreign relations. 157 As early
as 1812, the Supreme Court (Marshall, C.J.) decided whether
the government of France should enjoy sovereign immunity
for a claim against one of its armed national vessels.18 The
comity aspects of recognition of foreign judgments were in-
volved in Hilton v. Guyot.159 The Supreme Court applied
principles of international law in The Paquete Habana.16°
More recently, of course, Congress has delegated to the
courts the task of deciding when sovereign immunity should
be recognized for foreign governments or their instrumental-
ities, pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976.161 It would be hard to argue that immunity determina-
tions have no effect on foreign relations.1 62
The ABA report also noted that the International Guidelines'
approach was tantamount to an attempt to revive the "Bernstein
letter" exception to the act of state doctrine.16 Under that pro-
cedure, when the executive branch represented to the courts
that rejection of the act of state defense would not harm Ameri-
can foreign policy, the courts followed that advice. 6 A majority
of the Supreme Court expressly rejected the "Bernstein letter"
of International Trade and Practice, 57 ArrrlTusT L.J. 651, 658-59 (1988), 23 INT'L
LAWYER 325, 332-33 (1989) [hereinafter Task Force Report]."
157. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 57, § 1, cmt. 4 (1987). The R-
STATEMENT (THIRD) provides:
The special place of the judiciary in United States jurisprudence is significant
for the law of foreign relations as for other United States law. Judicial review
gives the courts power to invalidate actions of the political branches in foreign
relations-statutes, international agreements, and executive actions-as viola-
tive of the Constitution.
Id.; see also Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION, 205-24 (1972).
158. The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812).
159. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
160. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
161. 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1988), §§ 1602-11 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
162. See, e.g., Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 550 F. Supp. 869 (N.D. Ala.
1982). After the court entered a default judgment, the State Department suggested
that the judgment be vacated in the interest of U.S. foreign relations. See 23 I.L.M. 402
(1984). Subsequently the judgment was set aside and the action was dismissed. 596 F.
Supp. 386 (N.D. Ala. 1984), affd, 794 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S.
917 (1987).
163. See Task Force Report, supra note 156, 57 ANTrrRusT L.J., at 663, 23 INT'L
LAWYER, at 336-37.
164. See Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschap-
pij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954); cf. Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Fr~res Soci6t6 Anonyme,
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exception in First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, in
1972.165 The Third Circuit revisited the doctrine in Environmen-
tal Tectonics v. WS. Kirkpatrick, Inc.16 6 and again concluded "that
the Department [of State's] legal conclusions as to the reach of
the act of state doctrine are not controlling on the courts."1
67
No court has adopted the position that executive branch lawsuits
are exempt from the act of state doctrine. In Associated Container
Transp. (Australia) Ltd. v. United States, the court decided that the
invocation of the act of state defense to protect communications
sought by a civil investigative demand was premature.168 Noth-
ing in the court's discussion, however, indicated that the doc-
trine would not apply to government-initiated litigation. Thus,
although the Department may pursue the "Bernstein letter" ex-
ception by submissions to U.S. courts, it appears that the courts
will decide for themselves and will not be bound by the Depart-
ment's views.
2. Comity and Compulsion
Under Hartford Fire Insurance, a U.S. court has jurisdiction
under the Sherman Act over "foreign conduct that was meant to
produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the
United States." 69 If such an effect is present, a "true conflict"
between U.S. and foreign law would serve as the basis for a con-
sideration of whether that conflict requires abstention from the
exercise of jurisdiction. A "true conflict" only arises when the
foreign law requires the defendant to act in a fashion prohibited
by U.S. law, or compliance with the laws of the United States and
163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947); National Jurisdiction, 6 White-
man DIGEST § 1, at 13-20.
165. First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
166. 847 F.2d 1052, 1062 (3d Cir. 1988), affid, 493 U.S. 400 (1990).
167. Id. The decision itself reinforces the premise ofjudicial independence. The
court disagreed with the Legal Adviser's suggestion that the act of state doctrine did not
apply to the award of the contract in question, on the ground that the award might not
have represented a sufficiently formal expression of Nigeria's public policy. Id. at 406.
It agreed, however, that adjudication of the case would not be embarrassing to the
political branch's conduct of foreign relations, placing considerable weight on the exec-
utive's opinion on the latter point. The Supreme Court found it unnecessary to reach
the "Bernstein letter" issue in affirming the Court of Appeals' judgment. Id. at 405.
168. Associated Container Transp. (Australia) Ltd. v. United States, 705 F.2d 53
(2d Cir. 1983).
169. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, -U.S.-., 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2909
(1993).
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the defendant's country is otherwise impossible. 7" The latter sit-
uation would arise, as Justice Scalia suggested in his dissent,
when compliance with U.S. law would constitute a violation of
foreign law. 71 Such a situation will arise in very few cases. In
the vast majority of cases litigated to date, the foreign conduct
has been consistent with, permitted, encouraged, or otherwise
approved by foreign law, but has not been compelled by foreign
law, and compliance with U.S. law has not constituted a violation
of foreign law.172
The majority's requirement of a "true conflict" is inconsis-
tent with prior decisions of the Court that stressed the need for a
careful, particularized analysis of the interests of foreign na-
tions, 173 and "a careful inquiry into the reasonableness of the
assertion ofjurisdiction in the particular case."174 Moreover, the
requirement that the challenged conduct be compelled by for-
eign law appears to confuse the exercise of judicial discretion-in
the context of international comity with the evidence necessary
to establish the affirmative defense of foreign sovereign compul-
sion. If the British defendants could have established that their
challenged conduct was compelled by the British Government,
they would have been entitled to dismissal on the basis of the
defense of foreign sovereign compulsion, without any analysis of
international comity.1
75
170. Id. at .. , 113 S. Ct. at 2910-11.
171. Id. at __ 113 S. Ct. at 2922 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
172. See,-e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690,
707 (1962); Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 694 F.2d 300, 303 (3d Cir. 1982); Man-
nington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1293 (3d Cir. 1979); United
States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Info. Center, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,600, at
77,414, 77,456-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), modified, 1965 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,352 (S.D.N.Y.
1965); see also Don Wallace, Jr. &Joseph P. Griffin, The Restatement and Foreign Sovereign
Compulsion: A Pleafor Due Process, 23 INT'L LAWYER 593, 596-99 (1989) (discussing some
of these cases in context of foreign sovereign compulsion defense).
173. See, e.g., Soci&6 Nationale Industrielle Atrospatiale v. United States Dist. CL,
482 U.S. 522, 543-44 (1987) ("[T]he concept of international comity requires in this
context a more particularized analysis of the respective. interests of the foreign nation
and the requesting nation. .. .") Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 218 n.16 (1988)
(" [W] e are not unaware of the international comity questions implicated by the Govern-
ment's attempts to overcome protections afforded by the laws of another nation").
174. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 115
(1987).
175. See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690,
706-07 (1962) ("issue for the jury's resolution" remained because of the failure of the
foreign sovereign compulsion defense); Socitt6 Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197,
211-12 (1958) (noncompliance with production order excused since compliance would
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In Timberlane II, although the challenged conduct was not
compelled by the Honduran Government, the Ninth Circuit nev-
ertheless.held that there was a significant conflict between U.S.
antitrust law and a Honduran law, and that conflict, unless out-
weighed by other factors in the comity analysis, was by itself, a
sufficient reason to decline the exercise of jurisdiction. 176 The
majority opinion leaves open the question of, absent an alleged
"true conflict," whether, and if so, under what circumstances, in-
ternational comity requires a U.S. court to consider abstaining
from exercising jurisdiction. The -Court's decision will en-
courage private plaintiffs, state attorneys general and U.S. Gov-
ernment enforcement agencies to pursue aggressively conduct
outside the United States that is lawful where it occurs.
The "rogue elephant" of private treble damage suits177 and
private challenges to transactions reviewed but not attacked by
Government enforcers' 78 are especially troublesome because pri-
vate plaintiffs often are unwilling to exercise the degree of self-
restraint and consideration of foreign governmental sensibilities
that is exercised by the United States Government.179 The U.S.
Supreme Court's decisions concerning the "optional" nature of
the Hague Evidence Convention18 0 and the nonapplicability of
violate foreign law); Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp.
1291, 1297. n.14 (D.Del. 1970) (foreign sovereign compulsion immunizes an otherwise
illegal boycott).
176. Timberlane II, 749 F.2d 1378, 1384 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032
(1985).
177. See, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980). See
generally Raymond J. Pikna Jr., The Uranium Cartel Saga - Yellowcake and Act of State:
What WillBe TheirEventual Fate?, 12 CASE W. RES.J. INT'L L. 591 (1980) (discussing state,
sovereign compulsion defenses to antitrust violations); Philip Sutherland, Comment,
Rio Tinto-Zinc Corporation v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation: Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in
Antitrust Matters, 5 MONASH U. L. REV. 76 (1978) (discussing extraterritorial application
of American antitrust regulations).
178. See, e.g., Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco SA, 871 F.2d 252, modified,
890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989)*, cert. dismissed, 492 U.S. 939 (1989) (granting injunction to
private party after UK and U.S. Governments had cleared transaction); F.A. Mann, The
Extremism of American ExtraterritorialJurisdiction, 39 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 410 (1990).
179. See Timberlane i, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). The Ninth Circuit stated that
the court's cognizance of the possible international implications of its actions "is espe-
cially required in private suits . . . for in these cases there is no opportunity for the
executive branch to weigh the foreign relations impact, nor any statement implicit in
the filing of the suit that that consideration has been outweighed." Id. at 613.
180. Socit6 Nationale Industrielle Afrospatiale v. United States District Court,
482 U.S. 522 (1987). For amicus briefs submitted by France, the Federal Republic of
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the Hague Service Convention818 tostate laws appointing invol-
untary agents for service of process have reinforced foreign skep-
ticism concerning the willingness of U.S. courts to seek truly in-
ternational solutions to difficult procedural problems. This
skepticism will be strengthened by the aggressive position taken
by the Court in Hartford Fire Insurance.
The Commission's analysis of international comity in Alumi-
num Imports is remarkably similar to the Supreme Court's "true
conflict" analysis in Hartford Fire Insurance. Both conclude that
enforcement actions should proceed, despite foreign govern-
mental objections, unless the challenged conduct was required
by foreign law or compliance with local and foreign law would be
impossible.
It would be reasonable to expect that foreign governments,
confronted with such aggressive behavior by enforcement au-
thorities, courts, and private U.S. plaintiffs, will utilize "blocking"
statutes, 182 as well as intergovernmental negotiations, 18 3 to de-
fend what they perceive to be their legitimate sovereign inter-
ests.
An official of the British Embassy in Washington has
pointed out that:
One perverse result of the [Hartford Fire Insurance] judg
Germany and Switzerland, see 25 I.L.M. 1519 (1986) (France); id. at 1539 (Federal Re-
public of Germany); id. at 1549 (Switzerland); id. at 1557 (U.K).
181. Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988).
182. The Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980 and Exchange of Diplomatic
Notes Concerning the Act, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 834 (1982). The British Parliament
enacted the Protection of Trading Interests Act in 1980, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 834
(1982). The Act prohibits enforcement by U.K courts of certain foreign judgments
and, in certain circumstances, entities British citizens and businesses against whom for-
eign courts have awarded multiple damages to recover the noncompensatory element
of the judgment from the plaintiff through an action in a U.K court. Id.; see Canada:
Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, 33 Elizabeth II, ch. 49 (1985), reprinted in 24
I.L.M. 794 (1985); Australia: Foreign Proceedings (Excess of Jurisdiction) Act 1984,
No. 3 of 1984, reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1038 (198.4); France: Law Pertaining to the Disclo-
sure of Documents and Information of an Economic, Commercial, Industrial, Finan-
cial, or Technical Nature to Foreign Natural orJuristic Persons, C. PAN. Law No. 80-538
(Fr.), 1980J.O. 1799, reprinted in relevant part in Socit6 Nationale Industrielle Arospa-
tiale v. United States Dist. Ct., 482 U.S. 522, 526 n.6 (1987).
183. Japanese Trade Ministry to Study Plan by U.S. to Extend Reach of Antitrust Law, 62
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1560, 479 (Apr. 9, 1992). After the Justice
Department announced its change of policy in April 1992, Japanese Government offi-
cials announced that they believed the U.S. policy violated the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. Id.
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ment may be to reduce the incentive of other foreign states to
cooperate with the U.S. regulatory authorities, and in certain
circumstances, to give them no option but to make use of
blocking statutes. t 84
CONCLUSION
Recent pronouncements of the courts and policymakers of
the European Community and the United States underscore
converging trends and standards in antitrust enforcement. Eco-
nomic regulators on both sides of the Atlantic seek more vigor-
ous enforcement abroad in order to make their antitrust laws
meaningful and effective at home. Yet this movement toward
extraterritorial enforcement often leads to conflict among trad-
ing partners and uncertainty for transnational commerce. Re-
newed efforts are needed to develop a uniform approach to anti-
trust law that reflects the interests and respects the policies of
both the EC and the United States. Otherwise, regulators may
find themselves undercutting the competitiveness of the very
economies they seek to promote.
.184. Edmund Hosker, Remarks at International Bar Association Meeting, New Or-
leans (Oct. 12, 1993) in International Bar takes Aim at U.S. Litigation Practices, NAT'L LJ.,
Nov. 1, 1993, at 17.
